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
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
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# The BAROMETER



VOL. X, NO. 1

WEEK OF 10 JULY 1972

EDITOR:  
LCDR THOMAS J. LOFTUS  
SMC #2034

The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and information concerning the development and improvement of the professional environment at NPS and within the U. S. Navy.

OFFICERS, FACULTY, STAFF AND WIVES  
are invited to contribute articles  
of interest to the BAROMETER  
c/o The Editor.

GUEST QUOTATION: Commander Richard T. Ackley, USN (Ret), "The Soviet Navy's Role in Foreign Policy"

In a period of two decades, the Soviet Union has developed a modern navy employing the latest ship design, equipment, and weapons systems. Advanced technology has been balanced with rigorous progressive training, both in shipboard and staff functions. The net result is a first-class fleet that competes favorably with the U. S. Navy in every aspect, except carrier-based aviation. The Soviet Fleet presents itself to the world as an effective fighting force, yet this new Soviet Navy has never seen combat. Its primary peacetime function appears to be contributing toward the realization of Soviet foreign policy objectives.

By assessing the role of the Soviet Navy in foreign policy, we may be able to draw some tentative conclusions - tentative because our data are limited in quantity which, in turn, could mislead our qualitative judgments. Nevertheless, the patterns that emerge from our present analysis suggest:

1. The Soviet Navy aggressively supports Soviet policies oriented toward the defense of the homeland in areas peripheral to the Soviet coast, but such support is short of irrevocable combat (e.g., 12-mile limit and in the Black Sea).
2. The Soviet Navy avoids involvement in "limited wars" when U. S. combat forces are participants, thereby avoiding incidents of possible conflict, and lending support to the policy of avoiding war with the United States (e.g., Korean and Vietnamese wars).
3. The navy supports adventuristic Soviet policies, but short of direct hostilities that would lead to war with the United States (e.g., Cuban missile crisis, Arab-Israeli Six-Day war).
4. The Soviet Navy supports the foreign policy of enhancing Soviet international prestige and power by maintaining an overseas naval presence and by conducting extended cruises and exercises (e.g., naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, fleet exercises, and distant cruises).

It is difficult to determine the relative success of these policies as seen from the Kremlin; yet it appears that the most immediate and far-reaching role of the Soviet Navy has been in the area of ideology and the politics of persuasion. Peoples friendly to the United States are becoming less surprised when they encounter Soviet ships at sea or in port. The technical quality and military smartness of Soviet vessels are viewed as a credit to the Soviet Union. In areas friendly to the Soviet Union, the presence of Soviet warships serves as a moral support the regime in power and provide an image of support and security for the local people. To uncommitted and nonaligned nations, the presence of Soviet warships may tend to encourage their association with the U.S.S.R. - a friendly, progressive, and industrialized world power.

All in all, it can be seen that the Soviet Navy has been a vehicle for the export of Soviet foreign policy on a grand and worldwide scale. The navy performs diplomatic functions that cannot be duplicated by any other branch of the armed services or by any other civilian agency. The peacetime role of the Soviet Navy is indeed significant and perhaps, in part, explains the motivation of a great land power to construct a modern fleet and carry its ideological battle to sea.

(Naval War College Review, May 1972)

EDITORIAL COMMENT

A few words of comment for the new students who may be reading The Barometer for the first time. As can be seen from the heading, this is the first edition of Volume X which means this is the tenth quarter in which the Barometer has been published. The purpose of this paper appears above every edition, "The Barometer is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and information concerning the development and improvement of the professional environment at NPS and within the Navy." Thus the Barometer is primarily a vehicle for communications between the various parts of the command, namely students, staff and faculty. In this light it has been one of our policies to solicit and encourage contributions from all members of the NPS community. It is our conviction that it is important to provide such a means whereby individuals and groups can expose the rest of us to different points of view so that a better basis for understanding can be established. The second equally important purpose of the Barometer is the promotion of the spirit of professionalism in this environment and in the Navy as a whole. For this reason we shall continue to reprint selections from various sources which can contribute to this development.

LETTER OF IMPORTANCE:

From: Chief of Naval Operations  
To: Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School

Subj: Revised 12-18 Month (4-6 qtr) Management Curriculum; approval of

Ref: (a) Supt., NAVPGSCOL ltr NC4(36)/rlg 1550/8 of 13 Aug 71  
(b) Supt., NAVPGSCOL ltr NC4(03)/vd 1550/8 of 21 Mar 72  
(c) CNO ltr OP-0993CB-et Ser 1309P993 of 27 Dec 71  
(d) Supt., NAVPGSCOL ltr NC4(021)/vr 1550 of 14 Dec 71

1. References (a) requested authorization to increase the duration of the Management Curriculum up to 18 months to upgrade the quality of instruction. Reevaluations of support requirements submitted in reference (b) provides two options: Decrease the student input, or increase the number of faculty members to support this curriculum.

2. Neither of these options can be accepted per se. However, authority was granted by reference (c) in response to reference (d) to hire Management Operations Analysis faculty with the restriction that the total faculty hired would not exceed the levels represented by a student input of about 1106 with a planned average on board enrollment of 1675 (Case 2 of reference (d)). As a result of the world wide survey of P-Coded billets and current emphasis on improving management education in the Navy, no decrease in the number of students enrolled in the Management Curricula is anticipated. In view of decreases in the size of the Navy and reductions in the military budget, increases in faculty allowance cannot be provided. In fact, reductions in current authorized allowances can be anticipated. Additional faculty requirements for this purpose will have to come from within existing and anticipated personnel resources.

3. Authority to implement the revised curricula commencing with the input reporting in December 1972 is granted.

/s/ V. G. Lambert  
Deputy Director  
Naval Education and Training

EDITORIAL COMMENT:

This letter represents the results of months of planning and effort. For several years critics of the four quarter management masters program have compared with disdain the one year non-thesis program to the more comprehensive two-year programs in other curricula and called the management program the cheap way to get a master's degree. For different reasons both RADM Goodfellow and Dean Clauser have vowed to upgrade the management curriculum to the more realistic six quarter format. Now the Navy has endorsed and approved this proposal and implementation has been scheduled to begin with the December 1972 input. But the problems have just begun. Because of funding limitations the new curriculum and faculty resources necessary to implement it will have to be administered within present resource levels. In the words of the letter, "Additional faculty requirements for this purpose will have to come from within existing and anticipated personnel resources." If anything, anticipated personnel resources will be more limited than at present. This will mean that the managers of the school's programs will be faced with an unenviable resource allocation problem in order to carry out the avowed intent of the Superintendent and the Provost. An increase in the length of the management curriculum with its large number of students and even more the addition of the thesis requirement with its demand for thesis advisors will require serious adjustments in faculty load. Since it is difficult to believe that all those adjustments can be absorbed by the one department, it is more probable that this letter will have an effect on several of the other departments in the months remaining before implementation is scheduled to begin.